PRESTON D. MARSHALL, AKA Trent D. Farmer; v. Kevin B. Williams

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PRESTON D. MARSHALL, AKA Trent
D. Farmer; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
KEVIN B. WILLIAMS,
Intervenor - Appellant,
and
JOHN HUFFMAN, IV, Real Content
Media Group; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 10-17170
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01665-SI
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2012**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
FILED
APR 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-17170 2
Kevin B. Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
motion to intervene in a copyright infringement action. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the denial of intervention as of right, and
for an abuse of discretion the denial of permissive intervention. Prete v. Bradbury,
438 F.3d 949, 953-54 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
The district court properly denied Williams’ motion for intervention as of
right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) because Williams had other means of
protecting his stated interest. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450
F.3d 436, 440, 442 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth four-part test for determining
intervention as of right, and explaining that the proposed intervenors’ interests
might not be impaired if they have other means to protect them); United States v.
Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The party seeking to
intervene bears the burden of showing that all the requirements for intervention
have been met.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’ motion
for permissive intervention because Williams sought to raise a new state-law claim
for which there was no “independent grounds for jurisdiction.” S. Cal. Edison Co.
v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing “threshold requirements” for
permissive intervention); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Geithner,

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10-17170 3
644 F.3d 836, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2011) (independent-jurisdictional-grounds
requirement applies to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when they
raise new state-law claims). Accordingly, we dismiss that portion of Williams’
appeal concerning permissive intervention for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See
Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e allow appeal
of the denial of a motion for permissive intervention only if the trial court abused
its discretion.”).
Williams’ remaining contentions, including those concerning plaintiffs’ late-
filed opposition brief in the district court, cancellation of the hearing on his motion
to intervene, and denial of his request for leave to file a motion for sanctions, are
unpersuasive.
We do not consider Williams’ challenges to district court orders issued after
the denial of his motion to intervene because we lack appellate jurisdiction.
We deny the parties’ cross-motions for sanctions and Williams’ motion to
strike. We reject Williams’ notice of lien.
AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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