Rajwant Kaur, a.k.a. Kiranjit Kaur Butter, a.k.a. Kiranjit Kaur, a.k.a. Kiranjit… v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAJWANT KAUR, a.k.a. Kiranjit Kaur
Butter, a.k.a. Kiranjit Kaur, a.k.a. Kiranjit
Kaur Mahal; NAVJYOT KAUR,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
Nos. 07-71747, 08-73003
Agency Nos. A075-246-028
A075-246-029
MEMORANDUM*
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 17, 2012**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated petitions for review, Rajwant and Navjyot Kaur,
natives and citizens of India, petition for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders denying their motion to reconsider the denial of their first
FILED
APR 23 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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07-71747, 08-73003 2
motion to reopen, dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
decision rejecting their second motion to reopen, and denying their third motion to
reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of
discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen, and review de novo
questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005).
We deny both petitions for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to
reconsider where they failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s
previous order concluding that petitioners’ June 19, 2006, motion to reopen was
properly denied as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). The BIA also did not
abuse its discretion in rejecting petitioners’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim
where they failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada,
19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), and the ineffective assistance they alleged
was not plain on the face of the record. See Reyes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 592, 597-
99 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioners’ contention that the BIA violated due process by
disregarding their evidence of ineffective assistance therefore fails.
The agency correctly concluded that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over
petitioners’ October 19, 2007, motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (the
IJ may reopen a case “unless jurisdiction is vested with the [BIA]”); In re C-W-L-,

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07-71747, 08-73003 3
24 I. & N. Dec. 346, 351 (BIA 2007) (jurisdiction over a motion to reopen lies
with the BIA when it was the last body to render a decision in the case). In light of
the foregoing, petitioners’ contention that the IJ violated due process by failing to
consider the merits of their motion is unavailing.
Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ January
23, 2008, motion to reopen as untimely where, even assuming petitioners were
entitled to equitable tolling, they filed their motion more than 90 days after
meeting with present counsel and learning of the alleged ineffectiveness of their
prior attorneys. See Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir.
2007) (under equitable tolling doctrine, statutory filing period begins once a
petitioner “definitively learns” of her claim). Given its dispositive untimeliness
determination, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by declining to address the
merits of petitioners’ motion.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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