Lester K. Cornette v. PATRICK R. DONAHOE, USPS Postmaster General ; et al.

Patrick R. Donahoe has been substituted for his predecessor, John E.*
Potter, as Postmaster General under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LESTER K. CORNETTE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, USPS
Postmaster General ; et al.,*
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-35250
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05373-BHS
MEMORANDUM**
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 6, 2012***
Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Lester K. Cornette appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his employment action against the United States Postal Service
FILED
MAR 19 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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(“USPS”) alleging claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of
Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Cornette’s
discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act because Cornette failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he is a person with a disability, and
whether the USPS did not select him for its Associate Supervisor Training
Program because of his alleged disability. See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492
F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (elements of disability discrimination claim); Coons
v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884-86 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard
for determining whether a plaintiff is a person with a disability); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(B) (Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to federal
government).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Cornette’s
retaliation claims because Cornette failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
there was a causal link between his alleged protected activities and the alleged
adverse employment actions. See Coons, 383 F.3d at 887 (elements of prima facie
case of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act); Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star
Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements

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of prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and noting that the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was actually aware of the plaintiff’s protected activity).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cornette’s motion
for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment because Cornette
failed to show grounds warranting reconsideration. See W.D. Wash. L.R. 7(h)(1)
(reconsideration requires “a showing of manifest error in the prior
ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have
been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence”); MacDonald v.
Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (denial of motion for
reconsideration reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Cornette’s remaining contentions, including those concerning discovery,
default, his jury demand, and the timeliness of the answering brief, are
unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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