Dale W. Dugger v. EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., California Attorney General;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DALE W. DUGGER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., California
Attorney General; et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 11-16432
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02674-BJR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 21, 2012**
Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Dale W. Dugger appeals from the district court’s
judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
FILED
FEB 24 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-16432 2
Dugger contends that the state trial court deprived him of his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense when it precluded testimony,
pursuant to California Evidence Code § 352, related to the reputation of the law
enforcement rangers who arrested him.
Contrary to Dugger’s contention, the record reflects that the California Court
of Appeal, which rendered the last reasoned state court decision in this case,
addressed Dugger’s federal constitutional claim. Accordingly, we do not review
Dugger’s claim de novo, as we would if the state court had clearly indicated that it
had not reached the merits of his claim. See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 990
n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Dugger is not entitled to habeas relief based on the trial court’s exclusion of
reputation testimony because Dugger cannot maintain that the discretionary
exclusion of this testimony warrants federal habeas relief under clearly established
federal law. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 757-60 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has not established “a controlling legal standard” to evaluate
discretionary decisions involving such evidence. See id. at 758-59 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.

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