Jane Doe v. Federal District Court

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT; OFFICE
OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL; STATE OF ARIZONA
ATTORNEY GENERAL; PIMA
COUNTY; TUCSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT; CITY OF TUCSON;
CARONDELET HEALTH NETWORK;
MAYA MELENDEZ, Doctor, and others;
SONORA BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
CENTER; BUPP, Doctor, and others;
SOUTHERN ARIZONA MENTAL
HEALTH CENTER; UNIVERSITY
PHYSICIANS, at Kino Campus;
PELAYO, Doctor, and others; CODAC
BEHAVIOIRAL HEALTH SERVICES,
INC., including Dr. Bupp; HANLON-
TOTH, Doctor, and others; JAN
BREWER, Arizona Secretary of State;
PIMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT;
ANDREA HERBERT, Carondolet Health
Network,
No. 08-16942
D.C. No. 4:07-cv-00196-FRZ
MEMORANDUM*
FILED
FEB 03 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frank R. Zapata, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2011**
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, SKOPIL, and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Jane Doe appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her case.
Doe’s amended complaint raised numerous claims against multiple federal, state
and private parties, apparently arising out of incidents of involuntary commitment
in 2005 and 2006. We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. The facts of the case are known to the parties. We repeat them only as
necessary.
I
Doe first argues that the district court erred by holding that the amended
complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements and by granting
defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motions for
summary judgment.

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We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). The
district court correctly held that Doe’s amended complaint did not comport with
the pleading standards set forth in Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. A complaint “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal citations
omitted). And although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, even pro se
pleadings “must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with
notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66
F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). Doe’s amended complaint was insufficient to
provide notice to the defendants even under the liberal pro se pleading standards.
Accordingly the district court did not err in granting defendants’ motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.
For the same reasons, the district court did not err in granting the remaining
defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We review de novo the district
court’s grant of summary judgment. Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore,
LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2011). Because Doe’s complaint was not

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sufficient to give the parties notice of what she was pleading, it was also
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to what she was pleading.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
II
Doe next argues that the district court erred in dismissing her case with
prejudice and without leave to amend. We review a district court’s dismissal with
prejudice and without leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Eminence Capital,
LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
After a pleading is amended as a matter of course, a court should only grant
further leave to amend “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1) & (2).
Although the policy allowing amendments “is to be applied with extreme
liberality,” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1051 (internal quotation marks omitted),
there are several factors that weigh against granting successive amendments:
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment [or] futility of
amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In light of Doe’s
conduct in this action, the district court had good reason to believe that further

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amendments would be futile and prejudice the defendants. It was therefore not an
abuse of discretion to dismiss this case with prejudice.
III
Doe argues that the district court erred by denying her motions for a
preliminary injunction and her motion for an extension of time as moot. We
review the denial of both of these motions for abuse of discretion. See Harris v.
Bd. of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004) (denial of motion for
preliminary injunction reviewed for abuse of discretion); Ahanchian v. Xenon
Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010) (denial of motion for an
extension of time reviewed for abuse of discretion).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a strong
likelihood of success on the merits.” Harris, 366 F.3d at 759 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because Doe’s complaint was insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, she could not show a strong likelihood of
success on the merits. It was therefore not an abuse of discretion to deny the
motions for a preliminary injunction as moot.
Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to grant
an extension of time “for good cause.” FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). Although the district
court did not rule on Doe’s motion during the pendency of the case, the district

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court did not rule on defendants’ motions to dismiss until nearly seven months
after they were filed. Given that Doe had far more time to respond to defendants’
motions than she would have under a regular pleading schedule, it was not an
abuse of discretion to deny as moot her motion for extension of time.
IV
We have reviewed Doe’s remaining contentions and determine that they lack
merit. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed. All pending motions
are denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.

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