United States v. 2012-01-30 | 10-35912 | DEBRA HUBBLE V. CSS | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, District Judge for the U.S. District***
Court for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEBRA HUBBLE, No. 10-35912
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-766-ST
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Janice M. Stewart, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 13, 2012**
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,
District Judge***
FILED
JAN 30 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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October 6, 2010, United States Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart
affirmed the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff Debra Hubble’s application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433
(2008). Hubble appeals the decision. For the reasons discussed below, the
decision is affirmed. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we
restate them here only as necessary to explain our decision.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s rejection of the opinions of Dr.
Vradenburg, Hubble’s chiropractor. Dr. Vradenburg’s assessment that Hubble was
“fully disabled” was not consistent with the opinions of the other medical sources
who evaluated Hubble. Where medical opinions conflict, the ALJ must weigh the
credibility of the sources and resolve the conflict. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d
947, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is entitled to give greater weight to opinions
from “acceptable medical sources,” SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, *2, and his
conclusion that the other sources were more credible was not unreasonable,
Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956–57. To the extent that the ALJ was incorrect in stating
that Dr. Vradenburg did not perform a physical examination of Hubble and in his
interpretation of Dr. Vradenburg’s medical notes regarding Hubble’s ability to
control her pain with Ibuprofen, the error is harmless.

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The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting
Hubble’s testimony about the extent of her symptoms. Rollins v. Massanari, 261
F.3d 853, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th
Cir. 1998)). The ALJ reasonably concluded that Hubble’s ability to work with
similar impairments in the past undermines her claimed inability to work now.
Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666–67 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, the ALJ
found that Hubble’s actual activities are inconsistent with a finding of disability,
and that all the medical opinions besides Dr. Vradenburg’s support the conclusion
that Hubble is capable of sedentary work.
Nor did the ALJ err in discounting the statement of Mindy Deter, Hubble’s
neighbor. It was based entirely upon Hubble’s self-reported symptoms, which the
ALJ had already discounted.
The ALJ provided germane reasons to reject the 2005 third-party function
report completed by Hubble’s husband, Dan Hubble. The report had been edited
by another person, which called into question the credibility of the statements and
created inconsistencies within the report. The ALJ did not need to provide reasons
to reject Dan Hubble’s 2003 third-party function report because the report was
largely consistent with the ALJ’s determination of Hubble’s residual functional
capacity.

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The ALJ properly considered Hubble’s obesity and pain disorder in his
determination. He listed both as severe medical impairments and gave significant
weight to medical source reports that considered how Hubble’s obesity and pain
disorder might exacerbate the extent of her symptoms. His conclusion that they
did not further impact her residual functional capacity was reasonable.
The ALJ also properly determined that Hubble’s impairments do not meet or
equal Listing 1.02. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 1.02. The record does not
support Hubble’s contention that she was unable to ambulate effectively for a
period lasting longer than 12 months.
Additionally, the ALJ did not err in finding that Hubble is capable of
performing her past relevant work. The ALJ properly relied on the vocational
expert’s testimony that Hubble could perform the work as it is generally performed
in the national economy, based on a hypothetical presenting Hubble’s residual
functional capacity. See Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228
(9th Cir. 2009) (vocational expert opinion evidence is reliable if the hypothetical
“set[s] out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion at step four, and the ALJ was not required to reach step five.
The ALJ did not provide specific reasons for rejecting the 2004 and 2008

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testimony of Dan Hubble, some of which conflicts with the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity determination. However, based on the totality of the evidence
in the record, we are convinced that no reasonable ALJ, even crediting Dan
Hubble’s testimony, could have reached a different disability determination. Stout
v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, the ALJ properly considered or rejected the evidence in this
matter, and substantial evidence supports his findings.
AFFIRMED.

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