Glenna Jo Tramell v. the Golden 1 Credit Union

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GLENNA JO TRAMELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE GOLDEN 1 CREDIT UNION,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-17439
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01470-GEB-
EFB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 17, 2012**
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Glenna Jo Tramell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her employment action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Stewart v. U.S.
FILED
JAN 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-17439 2
Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Tramell’s action as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because it involved the same claims and parties as
Tramell’s prior state court action that was decided on the merits. See Kay v. City of
Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating requirements for
res judicata under California law).
To the extent that Tramell contends that the state court decision was
erroneous, the district court properly determined that those contentions are barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments”).
Tramell’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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