Carlos Javier Marulanda v. United States Marshals Service; Jay Mason

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable H. Russel Holland, United States District Judge for the**
District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLOS JAVIER MARULANDA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES MARSHALS
SERVICE; JAY MASON,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-16639
D.C. No. 2:04-cv-02798-HRH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
H. Russel Holland, District Judge, Presiding**
Submitted January 17, 2012***
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JAN 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-16639 2
Federal prisoner Carlos Javier Marulanda appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging violations of
his Fifth Amendment due process rights in connection with the destruction of his
personal property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because there is no
due process violation when Congress has provided an adequate post-deprivation
remedy for the unauthorized acts of a federal employee. See 31 U.S.C. § 3724(a)
(allowing the Attorney General to settle claims for losses caused by law
enforcement personnel); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (due process
was not violated by government official’s intentional deprivation of property,
provided that a meaningful post-deprivation remedy was available).
Marulanda’s remaining contentions, including those concerning the law of
the case doctrine, are unpersuasive.
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith
v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.

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