Marie Minns, an individual v. JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIE MINNS, an individual,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of the
Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-55930
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-07640-DDP-CT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 13, 2012 **
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY, District
Judge.***
FILED
JAN 18 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Marie Minns appeals the district court’s denial of her Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1) and (b)(6) motion for relief from judgment in her Title VII action alleging
race discrimination and retaliation arising from her employment as a nurse case
manager for the Veterans Administration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Minns’ motion for
relief under Rule 60(b)(1). First, the district court applied the correct legal rule –
the four-factor test established by Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick
Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). See Brandt v. Am. Bankers
Ins. Co., 653 F.3d 1108, 1110 (setting out the abuse of discretion standard of
review); Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000)
(applying the four Pioneer factors to a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)).
Second, the district court’s application of the Pioneer factors was not
illogical, implausible or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the
facts in the record. See Brandt, 653 F.3d at 1110. The district court reasonably
concluded that the prejudice, length of delay and reason for delay factors favored
denial of Minns’ motion. Although Rule 60(b)(1) can cover negligence on the part
of counsel, see Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1223, “ignorance of the rules[] or mistakes
construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect,” Pincay v.

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Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S.
at 392)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362
F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule, parties are bound by the
actions of their lawyers, and alleged attorney malpractice does not usually provide
a basis to set aside a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).”). Bateman is
distinguishable because, there, plaintiff’s counsel “wrote to the court twelve days
after it granted summary judgment and filed his Rule 60(b)(1) motion a little more
than one month after the court denied his request to rescind the judgment.”
Bateman, 231 F.3d. at 1225. Here, by contrast, Minns filed her motion 11 months
after the district court’s entry of judgment.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Minns’ motion
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Although we have held that gross negligence on the
part of counsel can justify relief under this provision, see Lal v. California, 610
F.3d 518, 524-26 (9th Cir. 2010), Minns has neither invoked this authority nor
made a showing of gross negligence.
AFFIRMED.

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