Mahendra Pratap Singh v. ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC, a foreign corporation registered

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAHENDRA PRATAP SINGH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC, a
foreign corporation registered and doing
business in the State of Washington;
BALDOR ELECTRIC COMPANY, a
foreign corporation registered and doing
business in the State of Washington,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35250
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00597-TSZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 9, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER, FISHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Rockwell Automation, Inc., and Baldor Electric Company terminated the
employment of Plaintiff Mahendra Pratap Singh as a business development
FILED
JAN 12 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The parties do not object to the district court’s decision to apply1
Washington law on this question.
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executive. Plaintiff challenged that decision in a lawsuit, but the district court
compelled arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement, and the arbitrator
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims on the merits. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s
orders confirming the arbitration award and compelling arbitration in the first
place, and we review de novo. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise
Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010); Aramark Facility Servs. v. SEIU, Local
1877, 530 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2008). We now affirm.
1. We affirm the district court’s order compelling arbitration because the
arbitration provision is not unconscionable under Washington law, either1
procedurally or substantively.
2. The issue of systemic bias—like other issues—had to be raised before the
arbitrator but was not. Even assuming that the issue was properly preserved, and
properly presented to the district court, the claim was not proved.
3. Plaintiff did not meet any of the statutory standards for refusing to
enforce a binding arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); Comedy Club, Inc. v.
Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) ("We have stated that
for an arbitrator’s award to be in manifest disregard of the law, ‘[i]t must be clear

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from the record that the arbitrator[ ] recognized the applicable law and then
ignored it.’" (alterations in original) (quoting Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec.
Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995))).
4. We need not reach any issues related to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 ("the Convention"), implemented by 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201–208. Plaintiff failed to raise his objections to the Convention’s
applicability in his opening brief; regardless, its applicability would not change the
outcome in any respect.
AFFIRMED.

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