United States of America v. Julius Kabukuru, a.k.a. Julius Ngabirano Kabukuru

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JULIUS KABUKURU, a.k.a. Julius
Ngabirano Kabukuru,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-50474
D.C. No. 8:09-cr-00178-SVW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2011**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Julius Kabukuru appeals from the 48-month sentence imposed following his
guilty-plea conviction for encouraging aliens to enter or reside in the United States
FILED
JAN 05 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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illegally, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
First, Kabukuru contends that the district court committed procedural error
because it failed to review, consider, calculate, use as a starting point, or remain
cognizant of the advisory Sentencing Guideline range. Although the district court
plainly erred, Kabukuru has not shown a reasonable probability that he would have
received a different sentence but for the district court’s error. See United States v.
Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 761-62 (9th Cir. 2008).
Second, Kabukuru contends that the district court committed procedural
error by failing to explain adequately the above-Guidelines sentence. The record
belies this contention.
Third, Kabukuru contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
The 48-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Fourth, Kabukuru contends that the district court erred by including
specifics about the second and third conditions of his supervised release regarding
the collection of a DNA sample, and the payment of a fine and special assessment,
in the written judgment that it did not pronounce at the sentencing hearing. We

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disagree. See United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994) (a
written judgment that simply clarifies an oral pronouncement is permissible),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir.
1999).
Lastly, Kabukuru contends that the district court erred by imposing a new
condition in the written judgment requiring him to file taxes during his period of
supervised release. Because this condition is part of the mandatory and standard
condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(a)(1) that the defendant follow the law, it was implicit in the district
court’s oral decision. See United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (9th
Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.

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