Matthew Ritter v. Matt Alexander;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW RITTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MATT ALEXANDER; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-16029
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00111-PMP-
PAL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Philip M. Pro, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 21, 2011**
Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Former Nevada state prisoner Matthew Ritter appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims related to
his pre-trial detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
FILED
NOV 29 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Ritter’s
deliberate indifference claims because he failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants consciously disregarded his serious medical
needs, intentionally delayed his access to treatment, or knowingly failed to protect
him from a serious risk of harm to his health or safety. See id. at 1057-58 (listing
standard for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; negligence and a
mere difference in medical opinion are insufficient); see also Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (standard for deliberate indifference to serious risk of
harm to health or safety); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)
(isolated neglect does not constitute deliberate indifference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Ritter’s
retaliation claim because he failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his brief
placements in isolation for medical observation and other security reasons were
based on his exercise of a constitutionally protected right. See Brodheim v. Cry,
584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (listing elements of retaliation claim); Pierce
v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1206 (9th Cir. 2008) (restriction on detainee
must be evaluated in light of officials’ objective to safeguard institution).
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Ritter’s denial
of visitation claim because he had no protected right to visits from friends or

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family, and failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the denial of visits with
his counsel prejudiced his trial preparation or ability to access the court. See Ky.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1989) (Due Process Clause
does not guarantee unfettered visitation); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
348-49 (1996) (access to courts, encompassing contact with attorney, requires a
showing of actual injury, such as prejudice to planned or existing litigation).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ritter’s requests for
oral arguments on fully briefed motions, for an extension to conduct unspecified
discovery, and to continue summary judgment. See D. Nev. R. 78-2 (motions may
be decided with or without hearing); California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779
(9th Cir. 1998) (party moving to continue summary judgment must explain what
further discovery is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment).
Ritter’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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