PETER NAVARRO, Jr. v. State of California;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER NAVARRO, Jr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-16508
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02562-JAM-
EFB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 21, 2011**
Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Peter Navarro, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations in
connection with the prosecution of a sex offense charge against him. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc.
FILED
NOV 28 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (failure to state a claim and Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th
Cir. 2004) (prosecutorial immunity). We may affirm on any ground supported by
the record. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322
F.3d 1064, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The magistrate judge properly recommended, and the district court properly
entered, dismissal with prejudice as to the constitutional claims barred by absolute
immunity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir.
2003) (addressing the scope of prosecutorial immunity). As to the remaining
claims for which the magistrate judge recommended granting leave to amend,
dismissal was proper because Navarro failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and
to link specific defendants with specific constitutional violations. See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Rule 8 requires a short and plain
statement of a claim that gives the defendant fair notice of the claim and its basis);
Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing causation element
of a § 1983 claim). Accordingly, after Navarro declined to amend his complaint,
the district court properly dismissed the constitutional claims with prejudice.
Dismissal of Navarro’s claims against the Vacaville Police Department was

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proper because Navarro failed to allege facts showing that a department policy or
custom, or the department’s deliberately indifferent failure to train its officers
properly, resulted in injury to him. See Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t,
227 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing grounds for § 1983 liability
against a police department).
To the extent that Navarro asserts a § 1983 claim against Solano County
based on his registration as a sex offender, dismissal was proper because Navarro
failed to allege facts showing that a county custom or policy caused him injury.
See Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 469-70 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc).
Dismissal of Navarro’s § 1983 claim based on his parole conditions was
proper because the Board of Prison Terms and its chairman in his official capacity
were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Flint, 488 F.3d at 824-25, and
Navarro failed to allege facts showing that the chairman in his individual capacity
caused Navarro’s alleged constitutional injury, see Leer, 844 F.2d at 633.
However, Navarro also asserted state law claims against several defendants
based on his registration as a sex offender. Because the district court failed to
address these claims, we vacate the judgment in part and remand so that the court
may decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Cf.

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Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994)
(requiring clarification on remand that dismissal based on declining supplemental
jurisdiction was without prejudice).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Navarro’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

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