Ronald Edward Smith v. CHARLES PLUMMER, Sheriff

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD EDWARD SMITH,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
CHARLES PLUMMER, Sheriff,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 10-16286
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-01637-MMC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maxine M. Chesney, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 11, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, KLEINFELD, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Ronald Edward Smith appeals from the district court’s denial of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court
determined that it must abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In the alternative, the district court also denied
FILED
NOV 15 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Smith’s Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), claim on the merits.
Because the district court correctly decided the Younger abstention issue, we
decline to reach the merits of Smith’s Santobello claim.
“Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping
principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of
Commerce Political Action Comm. v. San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir.
2008). Though Younger involved a federal plaintiff’s attempt to enjoin a state
criminal prosecution, the Younger doctrine also extends to state civil judicial
proceedings if the following four factors are met: (1) there is an ongoing state-
initiated judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state
interests; (3) the federal litigant is not barred from litigating federal constitutional
issues in the state proceeding; and (4) federal court action would enjoin the
proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere in a way
that Younger disapproves. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir.
2004) (en banc).
There is an ongoing state-initiated civil commitment proceeding pending
against Smith. The proceeding, brought pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent
Predators Act (SVPA), implicates the important state interests of protecting the
public from sexually violent offenders and providing such offenders with mental

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health treatment. If a federal court were to grant the relief Smith seeks, the action
would have the effect of enjoining the state SVPA proceedings.
Smith argues the state court proceedings no longer offer him an adequate
opportunity to litigate his federal Santobello claim. Smith has had the opportunity
to raise his federal constitutional claim in the state proceedings and indeed has
done so through every level of the California judicial system. Smith has not shown
that “state procedural law barred presentation of [his] claims,” Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987), or that “extraordinary circumstances” rendered
the California courts “incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating” his federal
constitutional issues, Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). Smith
“obviously disagrees vigorously with the result that he has achieved thus far in
California. However, his lack of success does not render the forum inadequate.”
Baffert v. California Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003).
A federal court may equitably intervene in an ongoing state judicial
proceeding if “there is a showing of ‘bad faith’ or ‘harassment’ by state officials
responsible for the prosecution” or “where there exist other ‘extraordinary
circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the
absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.’” Kugler, 421 U.S.
at 124 (internal citations omitted). Smith argues that he is suffering irreparable

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injury “just by being forced to ‘run the gauntlet’” of the SVPA proceeding pending
against him, but Younger makes clear that any injury suffered by a petitioner as a
result of being forced to defend himself against a state prosecution brought in good
faith does not rise to the level of “irreparable injury,” even where the petitioner
alleges the prosecution is unlawful. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (“No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his
alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to
be unauthorized and hence unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity . . . .”
(internal quotation omitted).
Because the district court correctly determined that it must abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over Smith’s § 2241 petition, we decline to address the
merits of Smith’s constitutional claim.
AFFIRMED.

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