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10-70655•Frederick Kerpsie v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
10-70655Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitNov 2, 2011
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FREDERICK KERPSIE,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 10-70655
Tax Ct. No. 21009-07L
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from a Decision of the
United States Tax Court
Submitted October 25, 2011**
Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Frederick Kerpsie appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s decision granting
summary judgment for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in his action
challenging a notice of federal tax lien. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C.
FILED
NOV 02 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS
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10-70655 2
§ 7482(a). We review de novo. Miller v. Comm’r, 310 F.3d 640, 642 (9th Cir.
2002). We affirm.
Because Kerpsie failed to oppose the Commissioner’s summary judgment
motion or file his own motion for summary judgment as ordered by the Tax Court,
he has waived any challenge to the Tax Court’s decision sustaining the filing of the
notice of federal tax lien. See Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095
n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (plaintiff waived challenge to claims by failing to
raise them in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment). Moreover,
there is no merit to Kerpsie’s primary contentions on appeal that the Sixteenth
Amendment was never properly ratified, that no statute imposes liability for
income tax, or that the payment of income tax is voluntary. See, e.g., United States
v. Nelson (In Re Becraft), 885 F.2d 547, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1989); Wilcox v. Comm’r,
848 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[P]aying taxes is not voluntary.”).
Kerpsie’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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