THOMAS EDWARD REDMOND, Sr. v. RANTZ, Dr.;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS EDWARD REDMOND, Sr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RANTZ, Dr.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-35972
D.C. No. 6:10-cv-00041-DWM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2011**
Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Thomas Edward Redmond, Sr., a Montana state prisoner, appeals pro se
from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under
FILED
NOV 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 2 --

10-35972 2
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.
1998) (order), and § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000),
and we affirm.
The district court properly concluded that Redmond’s claims were barred by
the three-year statute of limitations because Redmond’s cause of action accrued in
2006 when he was told that he needed additional post-operative physical therapy
and that the additional therapy had been denied. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d
987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”).
Redmond is not entitled to equitable tolling because he knew in 2006 that he
was not receiving adequate post-operative therapy, and the additional information
he obtained in September 2007 when he consulted with the specialist merely went
to the extent of his injury. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (“The
cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known
or predictable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.

-- 2 of 2 --