Ronald L. Porter v. RAY MABUS, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy

Ray Mabus is substituted for his predecessor, B.J. Penn, as Secretary*
of the Department of the Navy under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD L. PORTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RAY MABUS, Secretary, U.S.
Department of the Navy,*
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-15882
D.C. No. 1:03-cv-06291-AWI-
SMS
MEMORANDUM**
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2011**
Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Ronald L. Porter appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his employment action against the Navy. We have jurisdiction under
FILED
NOV 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

10-15882 2
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.
2008). We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to dismiss a
duplicative action. Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th
Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Porter’s claims
that were duplicative of his claims in his other pending actions. See id. (“Plaintiffs
generally have no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject
matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
After dismissing Porter’s duplicative claims, the district court properly
dismissed Porter’s action as moot because the court could not grant any relief on
Porter’s remaining claims. See Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.
2003) (a case is moot if there is no longer a possibility that the litigant can obtain
relief for his claim); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254
(1994) (prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII did not
allow for recovery of backpay “unless the discrimination was also found to have
some concrete effect on the plaintiff’s employment status, such as a denied
promotion, a differential in compensation, or termination”); Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of

-- 2 of 3 --

10-15882 3
Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2006) (former employee, who did
not seek reinstatement in her lawsuit, could not seek injunctive relief regarding
former employer’s anti-discrimination policies); Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285
F.3d 1174, 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Title VII forbade imposition of punitive, or of compensatory, damages; the
original Act provided only for equitable remedies.”).
Porter’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --