Frank Steffensen v. CASEY MAYHEW, Probation Officer;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANK STEFFENSEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CASEY MAYHEW, Probation Officer; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-35192
D.C. No. 4:09-cv-00004-RJB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 27, 2011**
Before: HAWKINS, SILVERMAN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Frank Steffensen appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal order and
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
FILED
OCT 07 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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novo both a grant of summary judgment, Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 978
(9th Cir. 2010), and a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a
claim, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any
basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d
1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to Mayhew on the
basis of qualified immunity because Mayhew’s authorization of a probationary
search of a vehicle was not a clear violation of Steffensen’s Fourth Amendment
rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-44 (2009) (qualified immunity
shields “an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes that
his or her conduct complies with the law,” and “where clearly established law does
not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment”).
The district court properly dismissed Steffensen’s claims against the federal
defendants regarding an allegedly unreliable witness because success on his claims
would imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Steffensen has not shown that his
conviction has been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487
(1994); Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (order) (applying Heck to
actions brought against federal actors).
To the extent that Steffensen’s claims regarding the federal defendants’

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alleged record-keeping errors are not Heck-barred, dismissal was proper because
Steffensen alleged no constitutionally protected interest. See Johnson v. Rancho
Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010) (for a due process
claim, the plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of an interest protected by
the Due Process Clause).
We do not consider arguments, including those regarding the Privacy Act,
made for the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th
Cir. 1999). Issues not raised in the opening brief, including those regarding
Steffensen’s conspiracy claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 18 U.S.C. § 241,
are deemed waived. See id.
Steffensen’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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