Miguel Oscar Perona-Aguilar v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Richard Seeborg, United States District Judge for the**
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL OSCAR PERONA-AGUILAR,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-71622
Agency. No. A70-919-541
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted August 29, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG, District
Judge.**
Miguel Oscar Perona-Aguilar (“Perona”) seeks review of a final decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion for a remand to
permit him to apply for voluntary departure in lieu of removal. The Government
FILED
OCT 06 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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characterizes the denial of remand as effectively a denial of a request for voluntary
departure, and argues that we therefore lack jurisdiction to reach the issue.
The Government reasons that the fundamental question presented by
Perona’s motion before the BIA was whether the expiration of the statutory bar to
his eligibility for voluntary departure would alter what it contends was a prior
decision by the immigration judge to deny voluntary departure on discretionary
grounds, regardless of the fact that Perona was statutorily ineligible for such relief
at the time. Citing Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2006),
the Government then argues jurisdiction does not lie to review an agency
determination declining to reopen a prior decision denying relief on an
unreviewable discretionary ground.
To the extent Perona’s motion for remand and his contention in this petition
can fairly be characterized in the manner the Government advances, it would be
true that this court would lack jurisdiction to review the decision. See 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(f) (“No court shall have jurisdiction over an appeal from denial of a request
for an order of voluntary departure . . . .”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . no court shall have jurisdiction
to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229c
[voluntary departure] . . . of this title.”).

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The better characterization of the relief Perona sought from the BIA and
seeks here, however, is not review of a decision denying voluntary departure, but
an opportunity to make an application for voluntary departure in the first instance.
No jurisdictional bar precludes this court from considering the merits of such a
claim. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003)
(similarly finding jurisdiction to consider merits of motion to reopen,
notwithstanding tangential relationship to a decision regarding voluntary
departure).
Contrary to Perona’s insistence that he never applied for voluntary
departure, the record indicates that during Perona’s initial removal proceedings, the
immigration judge asked if his counsel wished to “qualify” him for such relief, and
that counsel thereafter elicited testimony from Perona to do so. That application at
least arguably remained pending after the BIA remanded for further credibility
findings. Nevertheless, there is no dispute that Perona was not statutorily eligible
for voluntary removal until after his appeal to the BIA was pending. The
immigration judge’s assertion that she “would” deny voluntary removal on
discretionary grounds therefore was no more than an advisory opinion, not an
actual exercise of discretion regarding a matter presented to her for decision.

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As such, it was an abuse of discretion for the BIA to focus on whether
substantial evidence supported denying Perona voluntary departure on
discretionary grounds. See Virk v. INS, 295 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he BIA must consider and weigh the favorable and unfavorable factors in
determining whether to deny a motion to reopen proceedings on discretionary
grounds”). While the immigration judge’s prior comments may have suggested
what a likely outcome on remand would be, because the question had never
actually been adjudicated, the appropriate course of action was to remand to permit
Perona to make a complete showing as to why, in the actual exercise of an
immigration judge’s discretion, voluntary departure should be permitted.
Perona’s opening brief further asserts that the immigration judge
“improvidently” relied on his criminal record in rendering an adverse credibility
finding, and that therefore no substantial evidence supports that finding. Perona,
however, offers no substantive discussion of the extensive evidence unrelated to
his criminal record to which the immigration judge actually referred in making her
credibility finding. Instead, his argument is that because he obtained a remand on a
prior occasion when a different immigration judge referred to his criminal history
in connection with a credibility finding, he should have received a second remand
on the same grounds. This is wholly insufficient to meet Perona’s burden as

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petitioner to demonstrate that the second immigration judge’s findings were
unsupported, or that the BIA’s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.
The petition for review is GRANTED IN PART, and the matter is
remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals with instructions that it grant
petitioner’s motion to remand for consideration of an application for voluntary
departure. The petition is otherwise DENIED.

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