Khaled Nawaya v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

07-70664Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJan 27, 2011

Full text

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KHALED NAWAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-70664
Agency No. A079-642-440
MEMORANDUM*
KHALED NAWAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-71398
Agency No. A079-642-440
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted January 14, 2011
San Francisco, California
FILED
JAN 27 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Before: HUG, SCHROEDER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Khaled Nawaya, a native of Saudi Arabia and citizen of Syria, petitions for
review of two orders issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). In the
first, the BIA adopted and affirmed a decision by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
finding Nawaya removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for failure to maintain
his F-1 nonimmigrant student status and denying equitable estoppel. In the second,
the BIA denied Nawaya’s motion to reconsider its first order, and held that it
lacked authority to apply equitable estoppel against the Department of Homeland
Security.
This court “review[s] the agency’s legal determinations de novo, and factual
findings for substantial evidence.” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2009).
Petitioner’s status was terminated because he failed to pursue a full course of
study. The principal issue litigated before the IJ and the BIA was equitable
estoppel due to the alleged authorization by petitioner’s Designated School Official
of a lighter course load than the one required by the regulations. 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(f)(6)(iii). Equitable estoppel does not apply in this case.
One of the requirements for the application of equitable estoppel is that the
party claiming estoppel “must be ignorant of the true facts.” Morgan v. Gonzales,

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495 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court explained in Heckler v.
Cmty. Health Serv., that “[i]f at the time when he acted, such party had knowledge
of the truth, or had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could acquire
the knowledge so that it would be negligence on his part to remain ignorant by not
using those means, he cannot claim to have been misled by relying upon the
representation or concealment.” 467 U.S. 51, 59 n.10 (1984). The applicable
regulations clearly spell out the three limited situations in which a lighter course
load is permitted: academic difficulties, medical conditions, and on the final term
if fewer courses are required to complete the course of study. 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(f)(6)(iii). Petitioner does not contend that any of these reasons apply to his
case.
PETITION DENIED.

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