Clarence Davis v. CARMAN SUTLEY, Dentist

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLARENCE DAVIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CARMAN SUTLEY, Dentist,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-55545
D.C. No. 5:07-cv-01415-CBM-
RNB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 10, 2011**
Before: BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Clarence Davis, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference in connection with his dental treatment. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056
FILED
JAN 25 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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09-55545 2
(9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant because
Davis failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant was
deliberately indifferent in treating his dental pain. See id. at 1057. A difference in
medical opinion about the preferred course of medical treatment does not
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See id. at 1059-60; see also Franklin v.
State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A
difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities
regarding treatment does not give rise to a [section] 1983 claim.”). Moreover, a
“showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a
constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at
1060.
Davis’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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