United States of America v. Real Property Located at 11211 E. Arabian Park Dr., Scottsdale, Az

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 11211
E. ARABIAN PARK DR.,
SCOTTSDALE, AZ,
Defendant - Appellee,
AND REGARDING THE INTEREST OF
IRA W. GENTRY, JR.,
Claimant - Appellant.
No. 09-16843
D.C. No. 2:05-cv-00768-SRB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 9, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, TALLMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JAN 25 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Ira Gentry appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
government in an in rem proceeding under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and
981(a)(1)(C), seeking forfeiture of real property located at 11211 East Arabian
Park Drive, Scottsdale, Arizona (the res). The district court had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291. We
affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, Nunez v.
Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment was
appropriate here because, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Gentry as the non-moving party, there is “no genuine issue of material fact” that
the res was derived from proceeds traceable other than to securities fraud and wire
fraud. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, the government “is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Id.
Gentry concedes that the res was purchased with funds derived from the sale
of UniDyn stock in 2000. However, he argues that those sales were “100% legal.”
Gentry’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States government and
commit securities fraud and wire fraud estops him from claiming that his sales of
UniDyn stock in 2000 were legal. See Considine v. United States, 683 F.2d 1285,
1286 (9th Cir. 1982). In United States v. Gentry, D.C. No 2:06-cr-00464-SRB-1
(D. Ariz., Mar. 17, 2009), the jury convicted Gentry of engaging in a conspiracy

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from 1997 to 2002 to secretly acquire ownership of UniDyn stock, mislead the
investing public and the SEC through wire communications in order to inflate the
value of the stock, and then sell the stock through Canadian brokerage firms for
significant profit. The jury’s verdict was firmly rooted in a finding of fraudulent
conduct, and it prevents Gentry from disputing either the existence of the
conspiracy or the means used to effectuate it. See Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 570-71 (1951).
In addition, in response to one of Gentry’s motions for summary judgment,
the government submitted an affidavit from IRS Agent Linda Wallace attesting
that she was able to trace the purchase of the res to the proceeds of sales of
UniDyn stock and to Gentry’s fraud scheme. Gentry failed to make a showing
sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Agent Wallace’s
evidence of the essential elements of the forfeiture action. See Gorman v. Wolpoff
& Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009); Galen v. County of Los
Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007).
We also reject Gentry’s three additional arguments challenging the district
court’s grant of summary judgment. First, the complaint was timely filed within
five years of the purchase of the res. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Second, the civil
forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981, does not require the government to prove that
the funds used to purchase the res were the “profits” of unlawful activity. The

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statute subjects to forfeiture all property traceable to the “proceeds” of unlawful
activity and defines “proceeds” as anything obtained directly or indirectly as a
result of the unlawful activity, not limited to net gain or profits. 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(2)(A). Third, in a civil forfeiture action, the government does not need to
prove that the property was obtained at the loss to another or the market in general.
See 18 U.S.C. § 981. Gentry raised two additional claims but did not support them
with facts or citations to legal authority. Therefore, he has abandoned them. See
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 710 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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