Quoc Xuong Luu v. V. SINGH, Associate Warden;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
QUOC XUONG LUU,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
V. SINGH, Associate Warden; et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 10-15506
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-02783-LKK-
DAD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 10, 2011**
Before: BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Quoc Xuong Luu appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
FILED
JAN 24 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-15506 2
Luu contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition as
untimely. To the extent that Luu argues that his prior 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
should toll the limitation period, this contention fails. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); see
also Fergusen v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d)
does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that ended before the state
petition was filed”). The statute of limitations period for administrative decisions
is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(d), which requires filing within one year
from the date the administrative appeal was denied. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391
F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (limitation period began running day after
petitioner received notice of denial of appeal). Accordingly, Luu’s argument that
the AEDPA statute of limitations did not begin until after the resolution of his
§ 1983 action is without merit.
AFFIRMED.

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