Ysidro Gregorio Mendoza Santos v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YSIDRO GREGORIO MENDOZA
SANTOS; PAUBLA MARGARITA
HERNANDEZ VICENTA; CECILIA
MENDOZA HERNANDEZ; SALOMAN
MENDOZA HERNANDEZ; HILARIA
MENDOZA HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-72267
Agency Nos. A075-260-077
A075-260-078
A075-260-079
A075-260-080
A075-260-081
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 23, 2010**
Before: SKOPIL, FARRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners, natives and citizens of Mexico, seek review of a decision by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial
of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against
FILED
JAN 14 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Torture (CAT) relief. Petitioners argue the BIA’s adverse credibility findings are
not supported by substantive evidence because they may have been based on
mistranslated testimony. They also argue the BIA erred by ruling alternatively that
the events underlying their claims do not amount to persecution for the purpose of
establishing their eligibility for asylum. We reject these arguments and deny the
petition for review.
I.
Due process requires an asylum applicant “be given competent translation
services.” Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Even with no due process violation, “faulty or unreliable
translations can undermine the evidence on which an adverse credibility
determination is based.” He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003). Here,
the BIA’s first decision was reopened because of translation issues. Although
another round of hearings was conducted with a competent interpreter, petitioners
contend the BIA’s second decision may have been based on improperly translated
testimony and documentation from the first proceeding.
We conclude the BIA did not base its decision on “tainted” evidence from
the first proceeding. Rather, the BIA reasonably concluded that given the totality
of the record with its “widely various accounts,” it was not unreasonable for the IJ

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to state “that he did not know what to believe” and to require petitioners to submit
corroborating evidence to support their claim of persecution. Indeed,
corroborating evidence may be required whenever there is “reason to question the
applicant’s credibility.” See Chawla v. Holder, 599 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2000) (noting corroborating evidence may be required when the trier of fact
“either does not believe the applicant or does not know what to believe”). We
reject petitioners’ contention that sufficient corroborating evidence was either
provided or was unavailable.
II.
Even if petitioners’ testimony is fully credited, the incident they describe
must “rise to the level of persecution.” See Nai Yuan Jiang v. Holder, 611 F.3d
1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010). “Persecution is an extreme concept that does not
include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Wakkary v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rather, persecution is usually characterized as severe and sustained, “marked by the
infliction of suffering or harm in a way regarded as offensive.” Halim v. Holder,
590 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

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Here, petitioners describe a single incident when soldiers came into their
home and demanded food. The wife claims she was struck by a soldier when she
did not respond quickly to the demand, but was not seriously injured and did not
require medical treatment. The soldiers took food and stole other items from the
home. Petitioners related that an uncle had a similar experience with the soldiers
and they also attributed the death of a nephew to the general drama of the event.
We conclude that “although a reasonable factfinder could have found this
incident sufficient to establish past persecution, we do not believe that a factfinder
would be compelled to do so.” Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). We held in that
case that petitioner failed to demonstrate past persecution when he was detained and
beaten on one occasion, but did not suffer sufficient injuries to require medical
attention. Id. Similarly, in Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995), we
held there was no persecution where petitioner was detained and beaten but did not
require medical treatment. More recently, we have reiterated that not all forms of
discrimination, mistreatment, or even infliction of harm amounts to persecution.
See, e.g., Halim, 590 F.3d at 975-76 (harassment, including arrests and beatings, did
not amount to persecution); Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1059-60 (discrimination,

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including robbery, beatings, and being accosted by a threatening mob did not
amount to persecution).
III.
Petitioners failed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution. Because they did not establish their eligibility for
asylum, their applications for withholding of removal also fail. See Cortez-Pineda
v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting more stringent standard for
withholding of removal). Moreover, their CAT claim fails, both for lack of credible
testimony, see id., and because the incident at issue does not amount to persecution,
let alone torture, see Lin v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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