United States of America v. Sandy Johanna Ramirez- Krotky

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SANDY JOHANNA RAMIREZ-
KROTKY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-50174
D.C. No. 3:04-cr-02943-RTB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2010**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Sandy Johanna Ramirez-Krotky appeals from the 24-month sentence
imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
JAN 05 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-50174 2
Ramirez-Krotky contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing
to: (1) calculate the advisory Guidelines range at the beginning of the sentencing
hearing; (2) expressly consider the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553
and 18 U.S.C § 3583(e); and (3) explain the reasons for the sentence imposed. The
record reflects that the district court did not procedurally err. See United States v.
Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991-95 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Ramirez-Krotky also contends that the district court abused its discretion in
considering certain factors not contemplated by section 3583(e) in imposing the
sentence upon revocation of supervised release. The record does not reflect that
the court considered such factors.
Ramirez-Krotky last contends that her statutory maximum sentence is
substantively unreasonable. The sentence was reasonable in light of the court’s
emphasis on the need for deterrence and Ramirez-Krotky’s continued breach of
trust. See U.S.S.G. Ch.7, Pt. A(3)(b); see also United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d
1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A]t a revocation sentencing, the court may
appropriately sanction a violator for his breach of trust[.]”) (internal quotations
omitted).
AFFIRMED.

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