Avista Corporation Inc. v. Sanders County

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AVISTA CORPORATION INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SANDERS COUNTY; DORRIEN H.
WOLFE; DIANE LARSON; LESLIE
RICKEY; SEAN M. STEPHENS; JAMES
R. DOYLE; BONNIE M. SHARP;
RONALD GENE SHARP; RONALD
SCOTT SHARP; GREGORY STEWART
SHARP,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-35722
D.C. No. 9:05-cv-00201-JCL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 4, 2010**
Portland, Oregon
FILED
DEC 10 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The Honorable James P. Jones, United States District Judge for the***
Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
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Before: W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and JONES,
District Judge.***
Avista Corporation (“Avista”) appeals the Magistrate Judge’s decision
denying it leave to amend its complaint to add a claim under the Quiet Title Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2409a, to quiet title in a former railroad right of way. The right of way
is potentially owned by either the descendants of Arthur Hampton (“Individual
Defendants”) or the United States, but not by Avista. The Magistrate Judge held
that our decision in Avista Corporation Inc. v. Wolfe, 549 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.
2008), which concluded that Avista had no claim to title in any part of the right of
way at issue, left Avista without Article III standing to bring a Quiet Title claim.
Avista argues that its economic interest in the outcome of the ownership dispute
between the Individual Defendants and the United States gives it Article III
standing, and its ownership of a flowage easement over part of the disputed right of
way confers jurisdiction on its suit under the Quiet Title Act. Although we agree
with Avista that it has Article III standing, we affirm on the alternate ground that
the Quiet Title Act does not confer jurisdiction over a suit to quiet title in land
disputed between the United States and a third party.
Avista does have Article III standing to bring its Quiet Title Act claim.
Avista is adversely affected economically by not knowing the owner of the right of

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way. This adverse effect constitutes injury in fact. The injury to Avista is caused
by the lack of resolution of the question of land ownership. The requested relief of
resolution of the title dispute and a determination of the owner of the right of way
would redress that injury. Thus Avista has Article III standing. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
The Quiet Title Act, however, does not confer jurisdiction over a claim by
Avista to quiet title in a dispute between the United States and the Individual
Defendants. We have stated that “for initial jurisdiction to lie [under the Quiet
Title Act] there must be a conflict in title between the United States and the
plaintiff.” Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999). In
the present case, no such conflict exists. Although Avista does have a flowage
easement over part of the right of way, Avista’s ownership of the easement is
uncontested and cannot form the basis for litigation under the Quiet Title Act over
an unrelated title dispute between other parties. We sympathize with Avista’s
desire to have the title dispute between the Individual Defendants and the United
States resolved, but the Quiet Title Act does not enable Avista to force its
resolution.
Furthermore, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California v. United
States, 830 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1987), and State of Alaska v. Babbitt, 38 F.3d 1068
(1994), do not apply. Those cases concerned the Quiet Title Act’s exclusion of

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jurisdiction over disputes involving Native American territory, and thus were based
on the “fundamental authority of the Secretary to establish reservation boundaries
and to protect the property interests of the Indian tribes.” Metropolitan Water
District, 830 F.2d at 144. Such concerns are not relevant to this case.
Avista argues that the Magistrate Judge’s decision deviated from the
mandate in our prior decision. We disagree. Our mandate includes all issues
“decided explicitly or by necessary implication.” In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752
F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984). Avista cites cases in which the district court
directly violated our instructions. See United States v. Carpenter, 298 F.3d 1122,
1124 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Paul, 561 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2009).
Our previous decision in this case, however, listed issues we were not reaching, but
it did not specifically instruct the district court to do anything. See Avista, 549
F.3d at 1252 (“leav[ing it] to the district court to determine” unresolved issues).
This did not necessarily imply a conclusion that Avista had standing to bring a
Quiet Title Act claim, or that the Quiet Title Act conferred jurisdiction over
Avista’s case.
AFFIRMED.

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