Richard Wilmer Gruber v. JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary; CHIEF OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CDCR

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD WILMER GRUBER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary; CHIEF
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CDCR,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 09-17228
D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00524-JLS-PCL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 30, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Richard Gruber appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas corpus petition challenging his jury conviction and two-year sentence for
procuring or offering a false or forged instrument for recordation in a public office
FILED
DEC 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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California Penal Code § 115(a) states: “Every person who knowingly1
procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded
in any public office within [California], which instrument, if genuine, might be
filed, registered, or recorded under any law of [California] or of the United States,
is guilty of a felony.”
2
in violation of California Penal Code § 115(a). As the facts are known to the1
parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.
A rational juror could have found that Gruber “knew” that the Uniform
Commercial Code financing statements (“UCC-1s”) he filed were false or forged
within the meaning of California Penal Code § 115(a). See Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (holding that an “applicant is entitled to habeas corpus
relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”).
Circumstantial evidence introduced before his state court jury tended to indicate
that Gruber had knowledge that the judgment awards purportedly owed him were
not from a legitimate court and that the amounts claimed were so disproportionate
to the purported injury suffered that they could not be genuine. Thus a rational
jury could have determined that Gruber filed false statements, knowing them to be
false. Gruber is not entitled to relief of federal habeas corpus simply because the
facts are reconcilable with innocence, such that another jury might have reached a
different conclusion.

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3
A rational trier of fact could likewise find that the UCC-1s that Gruber filed
were “false” or “forged.” Gruber asserts that there was insufficient evidence
establishing that the UCC-1s he filed were “false” or “forged” because they
asserted claims he believed were genuine. There was sufficient evidence,
including the fact that the financing statements were based on judgments from a
fictitious court, upon which a jury could find that the debts asserted in the UCC-1s
were illegitimate and that the UCC-1s were therefore false. To the extent Gruber’s
arguments challenge California’s determination of its state law, we cannot give
federal habeas corpus relief. See Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400
(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that “errors of state law do not concern [habeas courts]
unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation”).
We decline to address the uncertified issues that Gruber raises. See Rhoades
v. Henry, 598 F.3d 511, 515 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the court may decline
to address uncertified issues where petitioner does not comply with Ninth Circuit
Rule 22-1(e)).
AFFIRMED.

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