United States v. 2010-11-12 | 09-35973 | CLIFFORD PORTER V. MICHAEL ASTRUE | nonprecedential |…

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLIFFORD PORTER, ) No. 09-35973
)
Plaintiff – Appellant, ) D.C. No. 2:08-CV-01555-JPD
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )
Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration, )
)
Defendant – Appellee. )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James P. Donohue, II, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 1, 2010
Seattle, Washington
Before: B. FLETCHER, FERNANDEZ, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Clifford Porter appeals the district court’s judgment, which affirmed the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits. We
affirm.
FILED
NOV 12 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002).1
See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 693; Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227; Light v. Soc. Sec.2
Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.3
2
We are satisfied that a reasonable mind could accept the conclusion that
Porter is not disabled. Bray v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222
(9th Cir. 2009); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). In fact, overall,
while not conclusive, we note that Porter was able to hold a job and engage in
many other personal and social activities for many years, and there is no indication
that his condition has significantly changed. See Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255,
1258 (9th Cir. 1992). More specifically, we agree with the district court that on
this record:
(1) The record supports the administrative law judge’s determination that1
Porter’s complaints of disability were not entirely credible because they conflicted
with the medical accounts, his own work history, and his regular activities,2
especially because he worked with essentially the same deficits for one employer
for a number of years.3
(2) The ALJ sufficiently explained why he did not accept the statements of

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See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir.1996).4
See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1163–64 (9th5
Cir. 2008); see also id. at 1161.
See Turner v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.6
2010); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir.7
2006).
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1).8
See Turner, 613 F.3d at 1223–24; Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 11159
(9th Cir. 2009).
3
the lay witnesses, Porter’s sister and former fiancée, on the basis that it conflicted4
with Porter’s own evidence of his activities, including his past work activities, and
with medical opinion. The ALJ did fail to mention one lay witness, Porter’s5 6
minister, but the evidence from that witness was so weak that it would not have
affected the decision.7
(3) The ALJ could properly reject the opinions of a physician’s assistant,
who was not an acceptable medical source, where the ALJ determined that the8
assistant’s opinion conflicted with the opinions of physicians. That reason was
certainly germane to rejecting the physician assistant’s opinion.9
(4) The ALJ, based on the medical and other evidence, could properly

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See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)(step 2); Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d10
1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing weight to be given to examining
physicians’ opinions); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201–02 (9th Cir.
2001) (same).
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v)(step 5); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d11
1071, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461–62, 103 S. Ct. 1952,12
1954–55, 76 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1983) (explaining Grids); Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1075–76
(9th Cir. 2007) (same).
See Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1077.13
4
conclude that Porter’s back problems were not severe, and that his mental10
problems were not sufficiently severe to preclude the use of the grids in deciding
whether work was available in the national economy.11
(5) The ALJ could properly use the grids in deciding that because Porter’s12
mental impairments did not pose a significant limitation, work was available in13
the national economy. On balance, the ALJ was not required to call a vocational
expert, although it may have been better to do so.
In fine, on this record we are not able to state that there was any prejudicial
legal error or that the evidence was insufficient to support the Commissioner’s
determination. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630; Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873
(9th Cir. 2003); Batson v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th
Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.

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