Thomas E. Beltran v. County of Los Angeles, a political subdivision of the State of California;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS E. BELTRAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political
subdivision of the State of California; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-56007
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00731-GAF-JWJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 6, 2010**
Pasadena, California
Before: HALL, FISHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Thomas Beltran timely appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputies Salim
FILED
OCT 26 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 4 --

-2-
Aimaq and Penelope Armstrong falsely arrested him, detained him for an excessive
period of time, and used excessive force against him. The district court held that the
undisputed evidence showed that no constitutional violations occurred and that the
deputies acted reasonably in detaining Beltran. We have jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The facts of this case are known to the parties and we need not repeat them.
Beltran may prevail on his false arrest claim if the deputies lacked probable
cause to arrest him. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th
Cir. 1998). Probable cause exists if, “under the totality of the circumstances known
to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair
probability that [the arrested person] had committed a crime.” Beier v. City of
Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). Undisputed evidence in the record
shows that the deputies had probable cause to arrest Beltran for burglary, having seen
him carrying things out of a house the deputies believed no one was permitted to
enter, and which Beltran admitted entering through a window. Thus, there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to the false arrest claim and summary judgment was
appropriate.
Summary judgment was also proper for Beltran’s excessive detention claim.
A detention, although initially appropriate, may be too long in duration to be justified

-- 2 of 4 --

-3-
as an investigative stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
Whether a detention is too long is determined by examining “whether the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id.;
see also Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002). The
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Beltran shows that the deputies were
diligently pursuing their investigation throughout the time Beltran was detained.
Beltran’s statements to the deputies that he was an attorney for the co-administrator
of the estate did not amount to exonerating evidence that stripped the deputies of
probable cause or eliminated Beltran as a burglary suspect. Even if the deputies
believed these statements, as Beltran alleges, the statements would have established
only that Beltran was an attorney for the co-administrator—not that he was not
committing burglary. Detaining Beltran after he made these statements, therefore, was
not excessive.
Finally, “[i]t is well-established that overly tight handcuffing can constitute
excessive force.” Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004).
Beltran’s claim against the deputies for excessive force is analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 388 (1989). This standard requires an evaluation of the officers’ conduct from

-- 3 of 4 --

-4-
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Id. at 396–97. Beltran was not
subjected to excessive force because, given the undisputed facts, it was objectively
reasonable for the deputies to finish their initial investigation of the residence and to
clear the area before addressing Beltran’s complaints about his handcuffs being too
tight. After finishing their initial investigation, the deputies properly loosened
Beltran’s handcuffs twice, when asked. Summary judgment was therefore proper.
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --