Majiman Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or*
by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral**
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Ronald B. Leighton, United States District Judge for the***
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAJIMAN HAFIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING,
ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Case No. 09-16746
D.C. No. 3:09-CV-01729-WHA
MEMORANDUM*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
William H. Alsup, District Judge Presiding
Submitted October 7, 2010 *
*
San Francisco, California
Before: RYMER and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and LEIGHTON, District***
Judge.
FILED
OCT 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Majiman Hafiz appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to remand. A
district court’s denial of a motion to remand for lack of removal jurisdiction is
reviewed de novo. United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 760 (9th
Cir. 2002).
Hafiz sought remand on the ground that not all defendants had consented to
removal. The district court denied the motion, finding that Defendant Marin
Conveyancing Corporation (“Marin”) had implicitly consented, that Defendant
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) was not required to consent
because it had been voluntarily dismissed, and that Defendant Quality Loan Services,
Corp. (“Quality”) was a nominal party not required to consent. Hafiz v. Greenpoint
Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 2d 1050, 1052-53 (N.D. Cal. 2009). This court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms the district court’s ruling.
The district court dismissed Hafiz’s action for failure to state a claim, and Hafiz
appealed only her denial of remand. When a judgment is made on the merits, an
appellate court is not required to remand if procedural defects in removal were cured
before entry of judgment. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1998), citing
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 77 (1996).
We agree that Defendant Marin’s consent was implied because Marin shared
counsel with defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding (“Greenpoint”), which had

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timely consented, and Marin and Greenpoint jointly moved for dismissal. Any defect
in Defendant MERS’s consent was cured by the time judgment was entered because
MERS did consent (albeit late) and because Hafiz voluntarily dismissed MERS from
the action prior to judgment.
Finally, Defendant Quality was a nominal party and not required to consent.
Under Parrino, reversal and remand to state court is unnecessary because any
procedural defects were cured before a judgment on the merits was entered.
AFFIRMED.

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