ABE WILLIAMS, Jr. v. Arnold Schwarzenegger

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument and therefore denies Williams’ request. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ABE WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 06-16997
D.C. No. CV-02-00864-MCE
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2010**
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Abe Williams, Jr. appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction
FILED
OCT 13 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and for an
abuse of discretion a denial of a motion to compel discovery, Hallett v. Morgan,
296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Williams’
allegations that Defendants misapply various provisions of the California Penal
Code rest on erroneous interpretations of state law such that Williams has not
suffered any constitutional injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; In re Dannenberg, 34
Cal. 4th 1061, 1079-80 (2005); In re Dayan, 231 Cal. App. 3d 184, 186-89 (1991).
Moreover, to the extent Williams’ § 1983 action challenges prior parole
suitability decisions or would otherwise necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
the duration of his confinement, it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’ motion to
compel discovery. See Hallett, 296 F.3d at 751 (trial court’s broad discretion to
deny discovery “will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that [the]
denial of discovery result[ed] in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining
litigant”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Williams’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

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We deny Williams’ motion for removal of the stay of proceedings as moot.
AFFIRMED.

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