Daniel Harper v. Sgt. Costa; Mendes

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL HARPER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SGT. COSTA; MENDES,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-16988
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02149-LKK-
DAD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 10, 2010**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, HAWKINS, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Harper, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants
violated his constitutional rights by issuing him a false disciplinary violation. We
FILED
AUG 27 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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09-16988 2
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Serra v. Lappin,
600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
Harper’s action was properly dismissed because his disciplinary violation,
and the associated penalties, were reversed through the prison’s administrative
appeal procedure, and because Harper did not allege facts suggesting that his
resulting administrative segregation imposed an atypical and significant hardship.
See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (under the Due Process
Clause, a prisoner may challenge a state disciplinary action only if it “deprives or
restrains a state-created liberty interest in some ‘unexpected manner’” or “imposes
some ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life’” (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
Harper’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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