Clarence V. Knight v. M. S. Evans

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLARENCE V. KNIGHT,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
M. S. EVANS,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 09-15323
D.C. No. 4:05-cv-03670-SBA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 10, 2010**
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Clarence V. Knight appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging the loss
of good time credits following prison disciplinary proceedings for possessing
FILED
AUG 26 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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We certify for appeal, on our own motion, the issue of whether the April1
21, 2003 prison disciplinary hearing violated due process.
09-15323 2
inmate-manufactured weapons. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and1
we affirm.
Knight contends that his due process rights were violated when he was
denied the opportunity to call his cellmate as a witness at the prison disciplinary
hearing. The California court’s determination that the denial of this witness did
not violate Knight’s due process rights was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);
see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); Bostic v. Carlson, 884
F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1989).
Knight also contends that his due process rights were violated when he was
denied the opportunity to present photographic evidence, pose questions to the
hearing officer, call a staff member as a witness, and pose some of his questions to
two adverse witnesses at the prison disciplinary hearing. The California court’s
denial of these claims was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-
68.
Finally, the California court’s determination that sufficient evidence

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supported the disciplinary decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);
see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-57 (1985).
AFFIRMED.

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