Richard A. Barker v. Board of Prison Terms;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument and therefore denies Barker’s request. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD A. BARKER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF PRISON TERMS; et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 07-15100
D.C. No. CV-03-06100-AWI
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 29, 2010**
Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Richard A. Barker appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have
FILED
JUL 23 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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We certify for appeal, on our own motion, the issues of whether the 20011
decision of the California Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) to deny parole violated
due process, the Eighth Amendment, and the Ex Post Facto Clause.
07-15100 2
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.1
Barker contends that the Board’s 2001 decision to deny him parole was not
supported by “some evidence” and therefore violated his due process rights. The
state court did not unreasonably conclude that some evidence supports the Board’s
decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546,
562-63, 569 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Barker also contends that the Board’s decision was based on a “no parole”
policy. We conclude that the California court’s rejection of this claim because
Barker failed to provide any supporting evidence was not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, and was not
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254(d), (e)(1).
Barker further contends that the Board’s decision rendered his sentence
disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We conclude that the
California court’s rejection of this claim was also not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, and was not
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C.

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07-15100 3
§ 2254(d); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (stating that the
“gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the
extraordinary case”).
Finally, Barker contends that the Board’s decision violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause because of changes in California’s sentencing laws. This contention fails
because “the application of the [Determinate Sentencing Law] parole-suitability
guidelines to prisoners sentenced under the [Indeterminate Sentencing Law] does
not disadvantage them, and therefore does not violate the federal constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.” Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032, 1034
(9th Cir. 1992).
Barker’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We deny Barker’s motion for appointment of counsel. We construe his
motions for judicial notice as citations of supplemental authorities. See Fed. R.
App. P. 28(j).
AFFIRMED.

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