Bonnie Jo Amyette v. Providence Health System, dba Portland Providence Medical Center

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BONNIE JO AMYETTE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM, dba
Portland Providence Medical Center,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 07-36016
D.C. No. CV-06-01704-ALH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ancer L. Haggerty, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 15, 2010 **
Portland, Oregon
Before: GOODWIN, PREGERSON and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Bonnie Jo Amyette appeals the summary judgment in favor of Providence
Health Systems (“PHS”) on Amyette’s claim of discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court exercised jurisdiction
FILED
JUL 19 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
affirm.
It is unlawful for covered employers to “discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a). “To prevail on a claim of unlawful discharge under the ADA, the
plaintiff must establish that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that
the employer terminated him because of his disability.” Humphrey v. Mem’l
Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Amyette, she has failed
to raise a genuine issue as to whether she is “disabled” under the ADA. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment standard); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.
Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (de novo review). “Disability” is
defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Amyette
argues that she has a mental health condition that substantially limits her ability to
engage in the major life activity of working. To be “substantially limited” in one’s
ability to work, one must be “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either

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a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i).
Accordingly, Amyette “‘must present specific evidence about relevant labor
markets to defeat summary judgment’ and ‘identify what requirements posed by
the class of . . . jobs . . . were problematic in light of the limitations imposed on
her.’” Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv. 492 F.3d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Amyette has failed to do so. The record is devoid of evidence that Amyette is
limited in her ability to perform a class of jobs. At most, Amyette has shown that
she is substantially limited in her ability to work alongside her colleague, Kay
Andrews, with whom she has an adversarial relationship. This is insufficient to
satisfy the “disability” element of an ADA claim. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)
(“The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.”); Walton, 492 F.3d at 1009 (9th
Cir. 2007).
Amyette argues that a jury might conclude that she is disabled because
doctors and medical examiners previously diagnosed her with adjustment disorder,
hypertension, and depression. We recognize that mental health conditions of this

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nature may be very serious, and we in no way discount the challenges that Amyette
may have faced in her efforts to overcome them. Under the ADA, however,
“disability” is a carefully defined term of art, which is measured by reference to
limitations on major life activities, not by reference to doctors’ past assessments of
the plaintiff’s condition. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 198 (2002), superseded by statute on other grounds, ADA Amendments Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 (“It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove
disability status under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of
an impairment.”). Regardless of whether Amyette has shown or could show that
she is “disabled” in the ordinary sense of the word, she has not provided any
evidence that she is “disabled” as that term is defined by statute. See Walton, 492
F.3d at 1009 (“Walton does not meet the evidentiary standard set out in Thornton
because she relies solely on Dr. Chelton’s letter, Dr. Sweetow’s expert report and
Dr. Cook’s report on auditory localization, none of which expresses any opinion
about relevant labor markets or Walton’s particular training, knowledge, skills or
abilities.”).
AFFIRMED.

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