Marc A. Sterr v. D. Baptista;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARC A. STERR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
D. BAPTISTA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-16773
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02307-DOC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 29, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Marc Sterr, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order, and the denial of his motion to reconsider the denial, in his action under 42
FILED
JUL 01 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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09-16773 2
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (“RLUIPA”). Sterr alleges that prison officials placed substantial burdens on
his right to exercise his religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and RLUIPA when officials restricted vegetation for Sterr’s
Earth-based religion to “grass only” and when they set a new schedule for the use
of the prison’s religious grounds. Sterr sought to enjoin the enforcement of the
new regulations. In denying Sterr’s motion for injunctive relief, the district court
held that Sterr had no likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, that he
made no showing of irreparable harm, and that the balance of hardships tilted in
favor of prison officials.
We review the denial of the preliminary injunction for an abuse of
discretion. Earth Island Inst. v. USFS, 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003). We
“determine de novo whether the trial court identified the correct legal rule to apply
to the relief requested.” United States v. Hickson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc). If the correct legal standard is applied “then we reverse only
when the district court reaches a result that is illogical, implausible, or without
support in the inferences that may be drawn from the record.” N.D. v. Haw. Dep’t
of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).

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09-16773 3
Here, the district court was guided by the more lenient preliminary
injunction standards of our pre-Winter v. Natural. Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct.
365 (2008), cases. We will not disturb the district court’s “denial of relief unless
the denial itself constituted an abuse of discretion.” McDermott v. Ampersand
Publ’g, LLC, 593 F.3d 950, 963 (9th Cir. 2010), citing, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009), because where we
would affirm the denial of injunctive relief under the pre-Winter standard we
would also affirm denial under the more stringent Winter standard. Id.
We conclude that the district court applied the correct law in determining
that Sterr was not likely to prevail on his Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims, and
we further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Sterr’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Earth Island Inst., 351 F.3d at 1298.
AFFIRMED.

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