Cheryl Blanchard; v. Morton School District;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties agreed to proceed**
before a magistrate judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
09-35171
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHERYL BLANCHARD; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MORTON SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-35171
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-05166-JKA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
J. Kelley Arnold, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted May 25, 2010***
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
The Blanchards appeal pro se from the district court’s order affirming an
administrative decision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
FILED
JUN 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

09-35171 2
(“IDEA”), and granting summary judgment on their claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for clear error the district court’s
findings of fact and we review de novo its legal conclusions and summary
judgment. Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 818
(9th Cir. 2007) (findings of fact and legal conclusions); Payne v. Peninsula Sch.
Dist., 598 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (summary judgment). We affirm.
Based on the evidence in the record, the district court properly concluded
that the school district provided the Blanchards’ son with a free appropriate public
education under the IDEA. See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 823-25 (no violation of the
IDEA where school district materially implemented the individualized educational
program and plaintiff failed to proffer evidence to the contrary).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the
Blanchards’ ADA and RA claims because they failed to raise a triable issue as to
whether or not the defendants were deliberately indifferent to their disabled son.
See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001) (claims for
monetary relief under the ADA and the RA require plaintiff to establish intentional
discrimination based on deliberate indifference).

-- 2 of 3 --

09-35171 3
This court previously affirmed the dismissal of the Blanchards’ claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and we decline to reconsider those claims here. See
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Under law of
the case doctrine, [] one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider matters
resolved in a prior appeal to another panel in the same case.”).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --