James A. Morgan v. Clark County Credit Union;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES A. MORGAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CLARK COUNTY CREDIT UNION; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-17605
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00333-PMP-
PAL
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Philip M. Pro, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 5, 2010**
Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
James A. Morgan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action arising from the alleged denial of disability benefits under an
FILED
APR 20 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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08-17605 2
insurance policy. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007), and we
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
because there was no diversity jurisdiction, Morgan pleaded only state law claims,
and Morgan’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was not colorable. See Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006) (“A claim invoking federal-question
jurisdiction . . . may be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is not
colorable, i.e., if it is ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” (citation omitted)).
Because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it properly
dismissed the state law claims. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d
646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a federal court has no discretion to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if the court dismisses the federal
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
We construe the judgment as a dismissal without prejudice. See Kelly v.
Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004).

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08-17605 3
In light of our April 29, 2009 order denying appointment of counsel and
stating that no motions for reconsideration shall be filed or entertained, we do not
consider Morgan’s challenge to the denial of appointment of counsel.
Morgan’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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