Ramon Ramos-Jimenez, a.k.a. Fidel Ramos Jimenez v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMON RAMOS-JIMENEZ, a.k.a. Fidel
Ramos Jimenez,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-70444
Agency No. A070-210-980
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted March 3, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD, IKUTA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Ramon Ramos-Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to
reconsider the denial of his motion to reopen.
FILED
APR 07 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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1. The BIA did not err in construing the motion to reconsider, in part, as
a motion to reopen, as Petitioner submitted new evidence in support of his motion.
Therefore, the BIA did not err in finding that the motion, to the extent that it was a
motion to reopen, was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
2. We do not lack jurisdiction over Ramos’s claim that the BIA abused
its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider, because the BIA addressed the
issue of prima facie eligibility. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040-41
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The BIA held that “the respondent remains ineligible to
apply for adjustment of status because the second Immigrant Petition for Alien
Worker (Form I-140) filed on his behalf is still pending and has not yet been
approved.”
We cannot determine whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying
Ramos’s motion with regard to this issue. First, the BIA’s statement above is
inaccurate, because 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(2)(i) allows for the concurrent filing of
both the I-140 and the I-485 (adjustment of status). Second, based upon our
review of the applicable case law, regulations, and statutes, it is not clear whether
an approved I-140 is required for the visa to be “immediately available,” when the
petitioner has an approved labor certificate with a priority date of April 20, 2001.

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See 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g); see also Merchant v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 461 F.3d 1375,
1378-79 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Finally, Merchant has successfully completed all
actions required by § 1255(i) to be performed by him and satisfied all of the
statutory prerequisites of § 1255(i)—i.e., the timely filing of his application for
labor certification, the approval thereof, and the appropriate filing of a Form I-140
(petition for visa) and of a Form I-485 (application for adjustment of status) with
the DHS, as well as demonstrating that an immigrant visa number is immediately
available.”). Therefore, we remand to the BIA to review whether Ramos had an
immediately available visa at the time of his motion to reopen. See Lanza v.
Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 919 (9th Cir. 2004) (remanding for the BIA to clarify the
grounds for its decision).
Ramos also failed to depart prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure
period. Whether the motion to reconsider must be denied for that reason is also
unclear. See Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cir.
2008) (per curiam). Ramos argues that he unilaterally withdrew his request for
voluntary departure when he renewed his I-140 application. Whether an
application for adjustment of status acts as a unilateral withdrawal of voluntary
departure has not yet been addressed by the BIA, therefore we remand for the BIA

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to address this issue in the first instance. See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12,
16-17 (2002) (per curiam).
3. The BIA did not err in finding that Ramos failed to demonstrate the
requisite prejudice for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ramos asserts
that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim arose out of the mishandling of his
I-140 application. The acts claimed to be ineffective assistance of counsel
occurred prior to and separate from the removal proceedings, therefore the BIA did
not err in rejecting Ramos’s claim. See Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1044,
1050-51 (9th Cir. 2008).
DENIED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART and REMANDED.

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