Manipal Singh v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Michael M. Anello, United States District Judge for**
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANIPAL SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 05-75727
Agency No. A097-608-278
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted March 10, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and ANELLO, District**
Judge.
Manipal Singh petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
FILED
APR 06 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Convention Against Torture. We grant Singh’s petition and remand for further
proceedings.
When the BIA does not perform an independent review of the Immigration
Judge’s decision, this Court reviews the IJ’s decision. Tapia v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
997, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility
determination and, to the extent an implicit determination was made, it was not
supported by substantial evidence. See Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir.
2000) (“Speculation and conjecture cannot form the basis of an adverse credibility
finding, which must instead be based on substantial evidence.”). Remand to the
agency for a credibility determination is therefore inappropriate. Cf. Hartooni v.
INS, 21 F.3d 336, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (remand for a credibility determination is
appropriate where the IJ has raised substantial questions about petitioner’s
credibility but did not make an explicit finding that petitioner was not credible).
Without an adverse credibility determination, we are required to accept
petitioner’s testimony as true. Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir.
2004). Once petitioner’s testimony is deemed credible, no further corroboration is
required to establish the facts to which petitioner testified. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379
F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Singh’s testimony regarding multiple instances of abuse, detention, and
threats adequately established past persecution on account of political opinion and
imputed political opinion based on the beliefs of his family. See Navas v. INS, 217
F.3d 646, 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) (to demonstrate persecution on account of
political opinion, the applicant must show he held a political opinion and his
persecutors persecuted him because of such opinion); see also Silaya v. Mukasey,
524 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Evidence that the alleged persecutor acted
because of a petitioner’s family’s political associations is sufficient to satisfy the
motive requirement.”).
“Once past persecution is demonstrated, then fear of future persecution is
presumed, and the burden shifts to the government to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that ‘there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that
the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution,’ or ‘[t]he applicant
could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s
country.’” Deloso v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 858, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) & (ii)). Here, the IJ did not shift the burden to the
government to rebut the presumption. We therefore remand Singh’s petition to the
agency for further proceedings to determine whether the government has

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demonstrated either that conditions in India have changed such that Mr. Singh no
longer has a well-founded fear of future persecution, or that relocation is possible.
We also remand Singh’s petition for further proceedings with respect to
withholding of removal and protection under CAT. Past persecution generates a
presumption of eligibility for withholding of removal. Mousa v. Mukasey, 530
F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). On remand the burden thus shifts to the
government to rebut this presumption by establishing either a fundamental change
in circumstances, or the possibility that Singh may reasonably relocate to another
part of the country to avoid any future threat. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i), (ii). We
also remand for a determination, with the assumption that Singh’s testimony is
true, of whether Singh adequately established “only a chance greater than fifty
percent that he will be tortured” if removed. Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821,
827 (9th Cir. 2004).
PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.

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