Tai Parie Braggs v. Joseph M. Arpaio

08-16318Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitApr 1, 2010

Full text

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
LSS/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAI PARIE BRAGGS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH M. ARPAIO,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-16318
D.C. No. 2:07-CV-01659-FJM-
ECV
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2010**
Before: SCHROEDER, PREGERSON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Tai Parie Braggs, a former pretrial detainee in the Maricopa County Jails,
appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
FILED
APR 01 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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action, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315
F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the action because Braggs did not
exhaust administrative remedies before filing his complaint in federal court. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) (holding that the PLRA requires
inmates to exhaust administrative remedies); see also Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d
1108, 1109 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that “proper exhaustion” requires adherence to
administrative procedural rules). Further, Braggs’s conclusory pleadings and
submissions opposing the motion to dismiss were insufficient to show that prison
officials frustrated his ability to grieve.
The district court did not err in considering the evidence Arpaio submitted
with his reply to Braggs’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, to which Braggs had
opportunity to and did respond. See Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 454 F.3d 975,
979 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that the district court did not err in
considering evidence first submitted in the moving party’s reply to the opposition
to summary adjudication where the evidence was introduced to counter claims

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made in the opposition, and the non-moving party could have asked the district
court for permission to respond).
Braggs’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I dissent.

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