Debra Ann Hadnot v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEBRA ANN HADNOT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-15189
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-05504-PJH
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 11, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, GRABER, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
This case is before us to review a summary judgment in favor of the
Commissioner and the denial of claimant’s motion for summary judgment and
alternative motion to remand. The summary judgment and denial thereof are
reviewed de novo, and the decision not to remand is reviewed for an abuse of
FILED
MAR 25 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000). Claimant raises
four issues.
1. The claimant has not demonstrated that the administrative law judge
(ALJ) erred in not developing the record regarding claimant’s dermatological
condition. The proof asserted by claimant is a statement by the ALJ that he is “at a
loss” to deal with the phrase “to avoid” pressure. In fact, the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity determination was consistent with Dr. Lapins’ opinion and
incorporated Dr. Lapins’ opinion that claimant should avoid excessive pressure.
Thus, the restriction of avoidance of “excessive pressure” was considered by the
ALJ in his residual functional capacity determination.
2. The ALJ did not err by rejecting the opinions of certain treating and
examining medical professionals. We have carefully reviewed the contentions of
claimant concerning the medical professionals and are not persuaded. It is true that
the district court held that the ALJ did not offer a sufficient basis for rejecting
Dr. Kipperman’s findings, but the district court was correct that this error was
harmless because other substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that
claimant’s mental impairment was not severe.
3. The ALJ did not err by refusing to credit claimant’s testimony and
third party statements. In weighing the credibility of claimant’s symptom

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testimony, the ALJ may consider, among other things, prior inconsistent statements
concerning the symptoms, “unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek
treatment,” and claimant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284
(9th Cir. 1996). We are restrained from second-guessing the ALJ’s credibility
decisions if they are supported by sufficient findings. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d
597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).
The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount claimant’s
testimony that she was unable to perform any work. No medical evidence
corroborated a complete inability to work. The ALJ found additional evidence
supporting the finding that claimant was not entirely credible. For example,
claimant stated that she received little improvement from surgery, but the medical
evidence indicated otherwise.
Similarly, the ALJ offered a germane reason for discounting Quilter’s
statement as it was inconsistent with the medical opinion evidence.
4. The ALJ may have erred in assessing claimant’s residual functional
capacity but, as set forth correctly in the district court’s decision, any error by the
ALJ in assessing claimant’s functional limitations was harmless.
AFFIRMED.

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