Ethelmarie D. Hubbard v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ETHELMARIE D. HUBBARD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-35389
DC No. 08-1446 CRD
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Carolyn R. Dimmick, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2010**
Seattle, Washington
Before: TASHIMA, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Ethelmarie Hubbard appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
denial by the Social Security Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of Hubbard’s
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
FILED
MAR 19 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403, 1381-
1383f. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s order upholding the denial of benefits.
Howard ex rel Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). We must
uphold the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and
if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Id.
Hubbard contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred at Step 2
of the sequential evaluation process in finding that her knee injury, obesity, and
hip, back, and shoulder pain were not severe impairments. Because Hubbard
prevailed at Step 2 and because the ALJ considered these alleged impairments later
in the sequential analysis, we conclude that any error in omitting the alleged
impairments at Step 2 was harmless. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th
Cir. 2007); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005).
Hubbard also contends that the ALJ erred at Steps 4 and 5 in finding her
“not entirely credible” and in improperly weighing the medical evidence.
We conclude that the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by specific, clear
and convincing reasons, including that Hubbard’s testimony about her depression
symptoms was vague and that her daily activities and the objective medical
evidence were inconsistent with her testimony about the severity of her symptoms.

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An ALJ may properly consider these factors in assessing a claimant’s credibility.
See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008); Burch, 400
F.3d at 681.
We also conclude that the ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical opinion
evidence. The ALJ gave specific, legitimate reasons, supported by substantial
evidence in the record, for according less weight to the doctors who opined that
Hubbard was limited to sedentary work or “severely limited.” See Lester v.
Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,
751 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the ALJ ultimately found that Hubbard’s abilities
were more limited than some other doctors opined. We conclude that the
conflicting medical opinion evidence in the record is at least susceptible to the
ALJ’s interpretation. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir.
1995) (“We must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the evidence is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation.” (citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750)).
Affirmed.

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