United States v. 2010-03-18 | 09-15740 | AARON CASTRO V. BRIAN WILLIAMS | nonprecedential |…

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral**
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AARON CASTRO, ) No. 09-15740
)
Petitioner – Appellant, ) D.C. No. 2:04-CV-01652-RLH-RJJ
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
BRIAN WILLIAMS; CATHERINE )
CORTEZ MASTO, Esquire, )
)
Respondents – Appellees. )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Roger L. Hunt, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 9, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, HAWKINS, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Aaron Castro appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas
corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
FILED
MAR 18 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1616–17, 75 L.1
Ed. 2d 610 (1983); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589–90, 84 S. Ct. 841,
849–50, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1964).
See Morris, 461 U.S. at 12, 103 S. Ct. at 1616.2
2
(1) Castro contends that the state trial judge’s failure to grant him a
continuance violated his constitutional rights and, thus, deprived him of his right to
counsel, as a matter of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Richter v.
Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). We disagree. On this
record, no clearly established Supreme Court law required that Castro be granted a
continuance; there had been ample time to prepare for the trial and counsel stated1
that he was ready to proceed. The fact that Castro wanted more investigation to be2
conducted, despite counsel’s opinion that further investigation was not necessary,
does not require us to overturn the decision of the Nevada courts.
(2) Similarly, we cannot say that the Nevada Supreme Court
unreasonably determined that counsel was not ineffective within the meaning of
the United States Constitution. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687–90, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064–66, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Castro’s
presentation to that court was not sufficient to require it to determine that counsel’s

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Castro alleged failures to communicate, to file additional pretrial motions,3
and to obtain experts (especially to conduct psychological examinations of the
child victims).
3
alleged failures were both objectively unreasonable and prejudicial.3
(3) Finally, Castro asserts that the district court erred when it determined
that certain of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims had not been exhausted
in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Scott v. Schriro, 567
F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019,
1023 (9th Cir. 2008). Again, we disagree. The district court properly determined
that Castro’s generalized ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the Nevada
Supreme Court was insufficient to encompass the specific claims he now asserts.
Thus, he did not give that court a fair opportunity to consider those claims. See
Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008); Moormann v. Schriro, 426
F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). That lapse on his part is fatal to his assertion that
the district court erred.
AFFIRMED.

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