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09-35527•Eugene Little Coyote v. United States Department of the Interior
09-35527Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMar 17, 2010
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EUGENE LITTLE COYOTE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR; BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS; EDWARD PARISIAN, Rocky
Mountain Regional Director; MARJORIE
EAGELMAN, Superintendent of the
Northern Cheyenne Reservation,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-35527
D.C. No. 1:08-cv-0003-RFC
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Richard F. Cebull, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 5, 2010
Portland, Oregon
Before: PAEZ, TALLMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Eugene Little Coyote is the former President of the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe. He was removed from office by the Tribal Council during an allegedly
FILED
MAR 17 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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unconstitutional special session. Following his ouster the Tribal Trial Court and
Tribal Constitutional Court issued contradictory decisions regarding the validity of
his removal. Subsequently, Edward Parisian, Rocky Mountain Regional Director
for the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), approved
budget resolutions and recognized the Vice President, Rick Wolfname, as the
interim President of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe (the “Parisian Decision”).
Parisian explained in his decision that he was prompted to act by the need to
resolve the impasse threatening the ability of the Tribe to perform basic
governmental functions.
Little Coyote sued the BIA in federal district court seeking an injunction
preventing implementation of the Parisian Decision and preventing the BIA from
withdrawing its recognition of Little Coyote as the President of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe. During the pendency of this litigation, the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe held a presidential election in which Little Coyote ran and was defeated. The
BIA argued that the intervening presidential election rendered Little Coyote’s suit
moot because the court could no longer grant any effective relief to his claims.
The district court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1). We
agree.
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“[A] case is moot . . . when one or both of the parties plainly lacks a
continuing interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L.
Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “The basic question is whether there exists a present
controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.” Outdoor Media Group,
Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vill. of
Gambell v. Babbitt, 999 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Little Coyote concedes that the tribal presidential election was valid and that
he cannot be returned to the office of President. He nonetheless argues that the
election did not moot this litigation because he has claims for back salary and
attorney fees against the Tribe and the Parisian Decision might preclude him from
prevailing on those claims. Such an allegation is purely speculative. Furthermore,
the claims are not alleged in the complaint and we decline to construe the
complaint to encompass hypothetical claims that may or may not be brought
against the Tribe in the future. Indeed, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe is not even a
party to this case.
Little Coyote’s claims do not fall within the capable of repetition yet
evading review exception to the mootness doctrine because there is no reasonable
expectation that he will be subject to the same injury again. Native Vill. of Noatak
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v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court was,
therefore, unable to grant Little Coyote any effective relief and the dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(1) was proper.
AFFIRMED.
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