Angelo Paul Perondi v. DORA SCHRIRO, Director of Operations;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
LSS/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANGELO PAUL PERONDI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DORA SCHRIRO, Director of Operations;
et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-17479
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-02833-ROS-JRI
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 16, 2010**
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Angelo Paul Perondi appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
FILED
MAR 09 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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indifference to his health as a result of exposure to lead contamination in the prison
water. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly determined that Perondi failed to establish a
triable issue as to whether the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive
risk to him from exposure to lead in the prison’s drinking and cooking water. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found
liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety[.]”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perondi’s request
for appointment of counsel because he did not demonstrate extraordinary
circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.
2004). The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Perondi’s
motion for class certification because Perondi was not an adequate class
representative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that class representative be
able to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”); C.E. Pope Equity
Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (lay person lacks
authority to appear as an attorney for others).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perondi’s motion
for a medical examination in light of Perondi’s inability to pay the associated costs.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 (providing no cost-shifting mechanisms); Childress v. Darby
Lumber, Inc., 357 F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing for abuse of
discretion decisions on discovery issues).
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perondi’s
request to amend his complaint to add a defendant, made after the discovery period
had ended and defendants had filed their motion for summary judgment. See
Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (denial of leave
to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
Perondi’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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