Daniel Sartain v. Robert Meyers;

08-55683Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMar 8, 2010

Full text

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL SARTAIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROBERT MEYERS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Nos. 08-55683
08-56317
D.C. No. 2:05-cv-05067-VAP-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 16, 2010**
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Daniel Sartain, a California state prisoner,
appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging that defendants failed to treat his chronic pain condition properly in
FILED
MAR 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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DS/Research 08-55683 2
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056
(9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Eighth
Amendment claim because Sartain did not raise a triable issue as to whether
defendants’ chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the
circumstances, and was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to
[Sartain’s] health.” See id. at 1058 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the equal
protection claim because Sartain did not raise a triable issue as to whether he was
intentionally treated differently from similarly situated inmates. See Thornton v.
City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sartain’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Sartain failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances warranting appointment of counsel. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d
1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).
Sartain’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

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Sartain’s February 3, 2010, motion for an emergency injunction and
restraining order is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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