Northern California Collection Services Inc. of Sacramento, a corporation v. CENTRAL SIERRA CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Nevada Corporation

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
COLLECTION SERVICES INC. OF
SACRAMENTO, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTRAL SIERRA CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
Defendant,
CENTRAL SIERRA CONSTRUCTION,
INC.,
Defendant-third-party-
plaintiff-cross- claimant - Appellant,
v.
PRO GROUP MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Nevada Corporation; et al.,
Cross-defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-17548
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-01899-JAM-
DAD
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
FILED
MAR 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 12, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: GOODWIN, BERZON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Based on the record before us, Central Sierra Construction, Inc. (“Central
Sierra”), failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding its claim that Pro
Group Management, Inc. (“Pro Group”), made material misrepresentations.
First, the record does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Pro Group told Central Sierra that Pro Group’s insurance coverage fulfilled Central
Sierra’s workers compensation obligations under California state law. The
Whitfield affidavit dated July 23, 2008, which is the only evidence adduced by
Central Sierra to support this point, is conclusory and completely devoid of
specificity. It fails to give the context in which Pro Group’s alleged representation
occurred or any details regarding the identity of the persons involved in this
alleged representation to Central Sierra. Because the affidavit provides only a
“skeletal set of bland allegations,” it is insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 n.12 (9th Cir. 1995)
(quotation marks omitted); see Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,
1061 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Second, Central Sierra failed to adduce evidence that raises a genuine issue
of material fact whether Pro Group’s alleged representation was false. The lawsuit
brought by the California State Compensation Insurance Fund (“State Fund”)
against Central Sierra does not raise the inference that Pro Group’s insurance was
insufficient to fulfill Central Sierra’s California legal obligations because State
Fund is not part of California government, see Cal. Ins. Code § 11771.5, and State
Fund sued Central Sierra for money owed under State Fund’s insurance policy.
Nor do the other documents in the record create a genuine issue of material fact.
The March 4, 2004 letter from State Fund states that Pro Group has not provided
proof that Central Sierra’s Nevada-based employees working in California were
covered under Pro Group’s policy. But Pro Group’s subsequent letter to State
Fund states that Pro Group was providing coverage for all of Central Sierra’s
employees performing temporary work in California. The California State License
Board’s “Exemption from Workers’ Compensation” form completed by Central
Sierra indicates that out-of-state contractors may be exempt from California’s
workers’ compensation requirements under certain circumstances. Even viewing
this evidence in the light most favorable to Central Sierra, such ambiguous and
self-contradictory evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that Pro Group’s insurance coverage did not fulfill California’s workers

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compensation insurance requirements. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581
F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009).
Central Sierra’s breach of contract claim likewise fails. As explained above,
the extrinsic evidence offered by Central Sierra does not create a genuine issue of
material fact that Pro-Group represented the insurance policy would fulfill Central
Sierra’s workers compensation obligations under state law, or that the policy does
not fulfill such obligations. Accordingly, the contract language is not “reasonably
susceptible” to the interpretation Central Sierra advocates. See Halicki Films, LLC
v. Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1223 (9th Cir. 2008). Because Central
Sierra has not established a genuine issue of material fact with respect to its
misrepresentation and breach of contract claims, Central Sierra’s indemnification
claim also fails.
AFFIRMED.

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