Florencio Ortiz Limones; Concepcion Diaz Delgado v. ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FLORENCIO ORTIZ LIMONES;
CONCEPCION DIAZ DELGADO,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-71952
Agency Nos. A095-180-619
A075-672-801
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 3, 2010**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, FISHER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Florencio Ortiz Limones and Concepcion Diaz Delgado, husband and wife,
petition pro se for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
FILED
FEB 11 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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affirming the immigration judge’s denial of petitioners’ application for cancellation
of removal. We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review petitioners’ claim
that the immigration judge denied them due process by refusing to permit their
daughter to testify regarding her health issues. The immigration judge did not
violate due process, because he fully credited Ms. Delgado’s testimony as well as
the documentary medical evidence regarding her daughter’s health. Petitioners
have made no showing that their daughter’s testimony would have been non-
cumulative. Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1074-76 (9th Cir. 2005),
Morgan v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1202, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2008), and Kaur v. Ashcroft,
388 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2004), are therefore inapposite. Nor have petitioners
shown prejudice. See Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2002).
We lack jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim that the immigration judge’s
hardship analysis was tainted by the judge’s erroneous conclusion that Mr.
Limones had committed a crime of moral turpitude, because petitioners failed to
raise this issue before the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Barron v. Ashcroft,
358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
Petitioners fail to present a colorable claim that the immigration judge
violated due process by failing to cite controlling law. See Mendez-Castro v.

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Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 744
(9th Cir. 2007).
We deny as moot petitioners’ argument that Mr. Limones was not convicted
for a qualifying crime of moral turpitude.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART.

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