Azewen-Jik Kante v. Nike, Inc.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AZEWEN-JIK KANTE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NIKE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-35067
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01407-HU
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, SKOPIL and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Azewen-Jik Kante appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Nike, Inc. on statute of limitation grounds. We review a
district court’s grant of summary judgment on statute of limitation grounds de
FILED
FEB 10 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Nike contends that the correct limitation period is three years under the1
Oregon Trade Secrets Act. As Kante would fail to meet even the more favorable
six-year limitation period, the court does not need to decide which period applies.
2
novo. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Locke, 568 F.3d 757, 764 (9th Cir. 2009). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
The facts of this case are known to the parties. We do not repeat them.
The most favorable limitations period for each of these claims is six years.1
See Everman v. Lockwood, 925 P.2d 128, 129–30 (Ct. App. Or. 1996)
(conversion); Jaqua v. Nike, Inc., 865 P.2d 442, 446 (Ct. App. Or. 1993) (implied
in law contracts). Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Kante, she
became aware of Nike’s alleged breach and conversion by July 2001 at the latest.
She filed suit in September 2007.
Kante also does not make a valid fraudulent concealment claim that would
allow tolling of the limitation period. See Chaney v. Fields Chevrolet Co., 503
P.2d 1239, 1241 (Or. 1972) (requiring wrongful concealment of material facts
actually preventing plaintiff’s discovery of the wrong committed).
AFFIRMED.

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